Research

We often hear that neighborhoods matter less than they once did, but our research challenges that assumption. Using detailed parcel- and household-level data, HUF Lab examines how neighbors and shared environments shape households—and how policy can leverage these relationships.

The mortgage industry is an intricate web of households, lenders, underwriters, governments, and financial markets. Within this complex system of policies, regulations, and financial products, HUF Lab researchers examine how the multi-trillion-dollar mortgage market operates and affects households.

Environmental change does not affect all households equally. Understanding who is exposed—and with what consequences—is critical to building more resilient communities. HUF Lab works closely with the Environmental Inequality Lab to examine disparities in environmental quality and exposure.

In democracies, policymakers are elected—not randomly assigned—and household circumstances can shape who governs and the policies they pursue. Using detailed data, HUF Lab examines how household finances, political affiliation, and polarization influence civic life, public policy, and urban environments.

Patrick Bayer, Marcus Casey, W. Ben McCartney, John Orellana-Li, Calvin Zhang

Abstract: We study neighborhood choice using a novel research design that contrasts the move rate of homeowners who receive a new different-race neighbor immediately next-door versus slightly farther away on the same block. This approach isolates a component of preferences directly attributable to neighbors' identities. Both Black and White homeowners are more likely to move after receiving a new different-race neighbor. Findings are robust to additional controls (e.g., income) and alternative research designs. We find evidence of heterogeneity in responses, especially associated with housing density, which has implications for understanding contemporary neighborhood racial change and prospects for maintaining stable, integrated neighborhoods.

Sanket Korgaonkar

Abstract: This paper documents the agency costs resulting from the deeper tranching of subprime residential mortgage pools. Mortgage servicers are less likely to renegotiate delinquent loans collateralizing a greater number and variety of tranches. We find that an interquartile increase in tranching reduces mortgage servicers’ probability of loan renegotiation by 14% relative to the mean. This effect is concentrated in mortgages with greater ambiguity surrounding the loan value maximizing action. Overall, our results support the notion that tranching worsens agency frictions by increasing coordination costs among investors and impeding their monitoring of the agent.